State of Utah v. Daniel Cornell Cosby : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2010
State of Utah v. Daniel Cornell Cosby : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. Rich Hawkes; Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association; Counsel for Appellant.
Ryan D. Tenney; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Bradford
Cooley; Salt Lake County Attorney's Office; Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Cosby, No. 20100974 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2640
Case No. 20100974-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Daniel Cornell Cosby, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from sentences on two counts of violating a protective order, 
one count of tampering with a witness, and one count of domestic 
violence in the presence of a child, in the Third Judicial District, Salt 
Lake City, the Honorable Robert Faust presiding. 
RYAN D. TENNEY (9866) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
E. Rich Hawkes 
Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association Bradford Cooley 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 2 7 20IJ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 20100974-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Daniel Cornell Cosby, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
Appeal from sentences on two counts of violating a protective order, 
one count of tampering with a witness, and one count of domestic 
violence in the presence of a child, in the Third Judicial District, Salt 
Lake City, the Honorable Robert Faust presiding. 
RYAN D.TENNEY (9866) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
E. Rich Hawkes 
Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association Bradford Cooley 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 9 
I.THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO JAIL RATHER THAN PROBATION 9 
CONCLUSION 14 
NO ADDENDA NECESSARY 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
BurMt v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42 (Utah 1989) 9 
State v. Gomez, 887 P.2d 853 (Utah 1994) 4 
State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,40 P.3d 626 13 
State v. haycock, 2009 UT 53,214 P.3d 104 9 
State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1996) ...11 
State v. Moreau, 2011 UT App 109, --Utah Adv. Rep.- 13 
State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1997) 2 
State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991) 10 
State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9,84 P.3d 854 11 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2009) 13 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-18-1 (West 2004) 4 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103 (West 2009) 1 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 20100974-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Daniel Cornell Cosby, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his sentences on two counts of violating a protective order, 
both third degree felonies; one count of witness tampering, a class A misdemeanor; 
and one count of domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class B 
misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Defendant to 
both jail and probation, where Defendant was being sentenced for four crimes 
stemming from two criminal incidents, Defendant has a long history of criminal 
behavior, and Defendant has repeatedly violated his probation in prior cases? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. "The trial court has substantial discretion in conducting 
sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence, and we will in general overturn the 
trial court's sentencing decisions only if we find an abuse of discretion/7 State v. 
Patience, 944 P.2d 381,389 (Utah App. 1997) (quotations and citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules in this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
In case 5671, Defendant was charged with: one count of burglary, a second 
degree felony; one count of violating a protective order, a third degree felony; one 
count of assault, a class A misdemeanor; one count of damaging or interrupting a 
communication device, a class A misdemeanor; and three counts of domestic 
violence in the presence of a child, all class A misdemeanors. R. 5671 at 7. In case 
5723, Defendant was charged with one count of violating a protective order. R. 5723 
at 1-2. 
1
 This is a consolidated appeal from cases 101905671 and 101905723. The 
State will refer to the cases as case 5671 and case 5723. The State will cite to the 
records as R. 5671 at and R. 5723 at . Defendant was sentenced for the two 
cases in a single hearing. The State will cite to the transcript of that hearing as R. 
47: . 
2 
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Defendant subsequently entered a consolidated plea bargain that resolved the 
charges in both cases. Under its terms, Defendant pleaded guilty in case 5671 to 
one count of violating a protective order, a tl lird degree felony; one count of witness 
tamper ing, a class A misdemeanor; ai id 01 le co in it of don lestic \ iolei ice ii i tl le 
presence of a fluid a * lass II- misdoni<\mi n I 'MI 1 ill 'i» In * iise ^723, I k li'inLint 
p leaded g tiilty 1 c one count of violati ng a protective order, a third degree felony. R. 
5723 at 27. In exchange, the remaining charges were c o r n e d , and the State agreed 
to recommend concurrent sentences. R. 5723 at 28-35 . . • 
Defendant was sentenced on November 1, 2010, R. 47, At sentencing, the 
trial court denied Defendant s request for probation. R. 4/ :  8 9. V'V hile the court did 
i ith : i '< >dit for ti me ser ved < >f 91 dai 's R 1 7: 9; 5671 i t.1 ' 38; 5723 ai ' 27. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Case 5671 
On June 9,2010, Stacey B. obtained a protective order against Defendant, who 
was her ex-boyfriend and the father of one of her children. R. 5671 at 4-5. That 
order "specifically prohibited]" Defendant from contacting Stacey and ordered him 
"to stay away from [her] home." R. 5671 at 5. On June 30,2010, Defendant knocked 
on Stacey's door and forced his way inside when she answered. PSI: 3. Stacey 
asked him to leave but he would not. PSI: 3. Defendant then demanded that she 
give him their child. PSI: 3. 
Stacey tried to run upstairs, but Defendant stopped her and took her cell 
phone away. PSI: 3. Defendant began shouting at Stacey in front of her three minor 
children. PSI: 4. A neighbor who was with Stacey at the time then took the children 
into her home and locked the door. PSI: 4. Defendant followed her, banged on her 
door, and threatened her. PSI: 4. 
2
 Some of the following facts are taken from the PSI, which is located in a 
manila envelope that is paginated as R. 5671 at 37. With one minor exception that 
will be discussed below, Defendant did not challenge the facts set forth in the PSI at 
sentencing. See generally R. 47: 2-4. He has accordingly waived the opportunity to 
do so on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6)(b) (West 2004); State v. Gomez, 887 
P.2d 853, 855 (Utah 1994). 
4 
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In the meantime, Stacey called police and reported that her ex-boyfriend was 
there trying to take the children. PSI; 3. Defendant fled before officers arrived. PSI: 
-tnrey told ^ ; i,eib mat LVidij^iunciu 'y^^iw^ ner in front of thechiiCLon i 
lhat her children had beg tin crying w hei i ti icy sa w tl i..e assault, R, 567 1 at I 
• On August 2, 2010, police received a report that Defendant was at Stacey's 
home again. PSI: 4. When officers arrived, Stacey denied that Defendant was 
there, instead claiming that she had not seen him for several weeks. PSI: 4. A fter 
an officer informed her that she could be charged with harboring a fugitive if it 
:i:;iii^ jLimatL.jc1]",;.,;. - . :. . ^ k \ \ ;. ne officers to search 
r .• * * « -
 :
::i . . . - I Lionel a ill in nn 
upstairs bedroom, ibi. 4. i-\$ Defendant was beirvj "\,:isported to jail 
acknowledged that he knew about the protective order and knew that he was not 
allowed at Stacey's apartment. PSI: 4. Defendant nevertheless stated that 
nothing would keep him from seeing his child, : bi, ;, 
\ s noted above. Defendant i, vas charged witl i one count of burglary two 
counts of violating a protective order, one count of assault, one count of damaging 
or interrupting a communication device, and three counts of domestic violence in 
5 
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the presence of a child. R. 5671 at 1-5; 5723 at 1-2. Pursuant to a plea bargain with 
the State, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of violating a protective order, 
one count of witness tampering, and one count of domestic violence in the presence 
of a child; in exchange, the other charges were dropped. R. 5671 at 26; R. 5723 at 27. 
AP&P prepared a PSI before sentencing. After recounting the facts of both 
incidents, the PSI recounted Defendant's adult criminal history, which included 
several convictions for making false police reports, several counts of domestic 
violence, several counts of domestic violence in the presence of a child, and several 
counts of violating no contact orders. PSI: 5-7. 
The PSI also noted that although Defendant had received probation after a 
previous conviction for violating a no contact order, he repeatedly violated the 
terms of probation in that case. PSI: 7-8. For example, Defendant tested positive for 
marijuana two weeks after his original sentence, tested positive for 
methamphetamine two weeks after the probation period had been restarted, 
absconded from supervision after his positive methamphetamine test, and 
repeatedly failed to report to AP&P during the subsequent probation period. PSI: 
7. Moreover, while serving that period of probation, he committed the crimes of 
DUI and providing false information to a police officer. PSI: 7-8. On March 23, 
2009, his probation was terminated unsuccessfully. PSI: 8. 
6 
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;\ith respect to the charges at issue here, Defendant gave a statement to 
AP&P in ^hich he denied any wrongdoing. PSI: 4. Among others, Defendant 
cidiiTitra mat^Ld^e) nau r.-\ ucahm- w- n r n o m e and denied assaulting her PSI: 4. 
; •..;•••... - ' •. . ' Sentencing Hearii ig ' . ' . ; •. -
,\1 sentm* iiiii,)l( defVnst1 counsel pointed unit 1h.it Ihc PcTs criminal hi<^ -v 
matrix incorrectly stated that Defendant had a prior felony conviction for a crime of 
violence. R. 47: 2-3. As noted by defense counsel, Defendant's prior convictions 
were all misdemeanors, R. 47: 2-3. The court agreed to make this change. R. 47:3. 
The parties agreed tnat i:\^ aaerauon wuuid piact ^xv^;wu,:\ i ^:ie:erit 
recommendatioi tc ; :e v- ; . . . : -. - •-. -*;* -\ . -. * r\ . .t-... -
Defendant m o^s • e< * •— . • - ^\• - * - -*•**• \ - ? 
Sanction" cateer^ -. R. 47: 3; see also PSI: Form 1. 
• Defense counsel then asked the court to sentence Defendant to a term of 
probation F. 47; 3-4. Counsel asserted that Defendant's prior crimes occurred 
while he was using drugs, but that he was now" clear 1 R, 47 : 3, Defense counsel 
spend tiixii e with hi s yoi: mg child R 47: 4
 : • ., .. , • . ' .."' . 
The State opposed this request. The State noted 'that Defendant had a long 
criminal history that included multiple incidents of domestic violence/ and also 'that 
7 ' ' 
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he had a "terrible txack record on probation." R. 47: 5-6. The State accordingly 
asked the court to sentence Defendant to prison. R. 47: 5. 
After hearing arguments, the court explained that while it recognized that 
Defendant appeared to now have "some motivation in [his] life" to change, the 
court still believed that Defendant had a "lack of understanding that [he has] to 
follow the rules." R. 47: 8. The court then stated that Defendant's "love for [his] 
son" did not justify his criminal behavior and continued non-compliance with court 
orders. R. 47: 9. The court accordingly suspended the prison sentences for the 
felony convictions, ordered 365 days in jail for the class A misdemeanor, and 180 
days in jail for the class B misdemeanor. R. 47: 9; 5671 at 38; 5723 at 27. The court 
also ordered that the two jail sentences run concurrently, and that Defendant be 
given credit of 91 days for time already served. R. 47: 9; 5671 at 38; 5723 at 27. The 
court also imposed 36 months' probation. R. 47: 9; 5671 at 38; 5723 at 27. 
Defendant now appeals his jail sentence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Defendant to jail 
in addition to probation. Defendant pleaded guilty to four different criminal counts 
stemming from two separate incidents. Two of his crimes were serious felonies. 
Moreover, Defendant is a repeat domestic violence offender who has consistently 
8 
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failed to comply with probation conditions in the past. Under these circumstances, 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO JAIL RATHER THAN 
PROBATION 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced 
him to jail in addition to probation. Aplt. Br. 8. 
As an initial matter, this Court need not decide this issue because it is now 
moot. Utah courts "refrain from adjudicating issues when the underlying case is 
moot/7 Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42,44 (Utah 1989). "A case is deemed moot 
when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants/7 Id/, accord 
State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, f 12, 214 P.3d 104 ("An appeal is moot if during the 
pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, 
thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect/7). 
In his brief, Defendant does not contest the imposition of probation; rather, he 
agrees that probation was warranted, but argues that the additional imposition of 
jail time was an abuse of discretion. See Aplt. Br. 9 (arguing that the court "abused 
9 
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its discretion by sending [Defendant] both to jail and to thirty-six months of zero-
tolerance probation with consecutive suspended prison sentences rather than 
simply putting him on probation'7). 
The State has learned that Defendant was released from jail on May 8, 
2011. Compare http://slsheriff.net/slsheriff/jail/jailupload/Roster_2011-05--
08.pdf (jail roster for May 8,2011) with http://slsheriff.net/slsheriff/jail/ 
jailupload/Roster__2011-05-09.pdf (jail roster for May 9,2011). Given that 
Defendant has now completed the jail sentence at issue in this appeal, this 
appeal is moot and should not be considered. 
In any event, if reached, Defendant's claim should be rejected on its merits. 
A " defendant is not entitled to probation, but rather the [trial] court is empowered 
to place the defendant on probation if it thinks that will best serve the ends of justice 
and is compatible with the public interest/' State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 
(Utah App. 1991). "The granting or withholding of probation involves considering 
intangibles of character, personality and attitude/' Id. at 1049 (quotations and 
citation omitted). An appellate court only reverses such a decision when it is "clear 
that the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion/' Id. at 1051 (quotations and citation omitted). 
10 
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An abuse of discretion occurs if "the actions of the judge in sentencing were 
inherently unfair or if the judge imposed a clearly excessive sentence/7 State v. 
Montoya, 929 P.2d 356,358 (Utah App. 1996) (quotations and citation omitted). Put 
differently, a court only abuses its discretion when "no reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court." Id.; accord State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 
9, f 12,84 P.3d 854. 
In this case, Defendant has not shown that no reasonable person would have 
sentenced him to jail, rather than ordering yet another term of straight probation. 
As noted above, Defendant was originally charged with one second degree felony, 
two third degree felonies, and five misdemeanors, but was ultimately allowed to 
plead guilty to just one third degree felony and two misdemeanors. R. 5671 at 1-5; 
R. 5723 at 1-2, 28-35. More importantly, the crimes at issue in both cases were 
serious —the crimes in case 5671 were crimes of violence in front of several young 
children, and the crime at issue in case 5723 was a repeat violation of a protective 
order. Given the nature of these crimes alone, incarceration was clearly warranted. 
While Defendant now contends that he should have been given probation 
without jail time, his undisputed criminal record supports the court's denial of that 
request for two reasons. First, Defendant already has a lengthy criminal history that 
includes several prior convictions for domestic violence, domestic violence in the 
11 
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presence of a child, and violations of previous no contact orders. PSI: 5-7. Second, 
when Defendant was placed on probation in conjunction with an earlier case, he 
repeatedly failed to comply with its terms. Among others, Defendant had several 
positive drug tests while on probation, repeatedly failed to report to AP&P, and was 
arrested for DUI and providing false information to a police officer during the 
probationary period. PSI: 7-8. That period of probation was ultimately terminated 
unsuccessfully in March 2009. PSI: 8. Thus, Defendant's own conduct has 
demonstrated that any period of probation would likely be unsuccessful. 
Although Defendant now claims that he has turned his life around since the 
previous probationary period, the crimes at issue here occurred just over a year after 
his probation had terminated unsuccessfully, thereby showing a continuing 
willingness to engage in criminal conduct. And although Defendant suggests that 
his newfound concern over his infant son would motivate him to comply with any 
probation terms, that argument ignores the fact that these crimes occurred precisely 
because of his purported concern over his son. As noted above, both criminal 
incidents began when Defendant violated a protective order to gain to access son, 
and the violence at issue in case 5671 was apparently the result of Defendant's 
desire to take his son. 
12 
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But more importantly, no law or statute required the trial court to give any 
particular weight to Defendant's self-serving assertions that he was now a good 
candidate for probation. Instead, the "exercise of discretion in sentencing 
necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can 
properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the 
view adopted by the trial court." State v. Moreau, 2011 UT App 109, | 6, — Utah 
Adv. Rep. — (quotations and citations omitted). 
Here, the personal judgment of the court was that the crimes at issue, 
Defendant's lengthy criminal history, and Defendant's repeated willingness to 
disobey court orders all showed that some jail time was warranted. Defendant has 
not shown that no reasonable person would take that view. Defendant's sentence 
should accordingly be affirmed.3 
3
 In his brief, Defendant repeatedly relies on State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,115, 
40 P.3d 626, as support for the claim that trial courts must sometimes give certain 
weight to mitigating circumstances. Aplt. Br. 8,10-11. But the issue in Helms was 
whether the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to consider all of the 
factors set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2009) for the imposition of 
consecutive sentences. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, |^f 8-16. Unlike the 
consecutive/ concurrent context, there is no similar statutory requirement when the 
question is whether to order prison or probation and the sentences are concurrent. 
Helms is therefore inapposite. 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the sentence. 
Respectfully submitted Tune 2J-, 2011. 
- MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
n t , ^ - r -
RYAN DyTENNEY / 
Assistant Attorney General ^ 
Counsel for Appellee 
D./TEN 
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